Evidence from an interactive experiment indicates that the tendency of users to anchor on one-sided disclosures of risk (i.e., disclosing upside potential or downside risk, but not both) is robust to whether disclosures are determined exogenously or chosen strategically by opportunistic agents with known preferences for higher valuations. This study therefore addresses qualifications in prior research about the generalizability of cognitive disclosure phenomena to a strategic disclosure environment. One implication supported by the data is that if cognitive biases such as the anchoring effect for one-sided risk disclosures are robust to a strategic environment, strategic agents can capitalize on these biases, extending the menu of strategic opportunities beyond those typically considered in economic models of disclosure.
I. Introduction
Disclosures of risk are often incomplete, emphasizing one side of a risky distribution more than the other. Examples include environmental liability disclosures (Kennedy et al. 1998 ), disclosures of oil and gas reserves (Dietrich et al. 2001) , and disclosures of risk associated with derivative financial instruments (Hodder et al. 2001; Jorion 2002; Koonce et al. 2003) . If management discloses the upside opportunity of a risky prospect but not the downside risk, or vice versa, how might such one-sided disclosures influence market decision makers?
This study explores the different answers to this question that arise from the information processing perspective of cognitive psychology and the strategic perspective of information economics. In psychology, researchers draw on what is often termed the "concreteness principle" (Slovic 1972; Payne et al. 1993; Mellers et al. 1998 ) to answer questions of this nature. The premise of this principle is that the "cognitive strain of integrating information" leads decision makers to emphasize "information that is explicitly displayed in the stimulus object," whereas "information that has to be ... inferred from the display, or transformed will be discounted or ignored" (Payne et al. 1993, 49) . Thus, for one-sided disclosures of risk, the concreteness principle suggests that users would be more optimistic in valuing a risky prospect if they see a disclosure of upside opportunity than if they see a disclosure of downside risk, even if the nondisclosed side of the distribution can and should be inferred by a rational decision maker.
This prediction is consistent with evidence from multiple experimental studies that manipulate various forms of one-sided risk disclosures as exogenous treatment factors (Kennedy et al. 1998; Dietrich et al. 2001; Koonce et al. 2003) .
The current study enriches this perspective by also considering a different perspective motivated from information economics. Namely, disclosures do not occur in a vacuum, but rather reflect the endogenous preferences of strategic agents. In equilibrium, financial statement users can anticipate these preferences, drawing inferences from disclosure choices about the private information motivating these choices. For one-sided risk disclosures, if management discloses the upside potential of a risky prospect but not the downside risk (or vice versa), the strategic user could infer that the information management chose not to disclose is less favorable than the information management volunteered to disclose. Dye (2001, 184) emphasizes that this more strategic perspective "is most interesting in the light it sheds on how to interpret silence, or, more generally, less than full disclosure."
Dye's observation is provocative, because its emphasis on the implied over the explicit appears to challenge the emphasis in the cognitive psychology literature on the explicit over the implied. This apparent conflict probably helps to explain why several experimental studies that manipulate accounting disclosures as exogenous treatment factors acknowledge questionable ability to generalize to a more strategic environment with endogenous disclosures (e.g., Bloomfield and Libby 1996; Hopkins 1996; Kennedy et al. 1998; Bloomfield and Wilks 2000; Hopkins et al. 2000; Dietrich et al. 2001) . Other experimental studies have explored the choices and inferences market agents make when disclosures are discretionary (e.g., King and Wallin 1991a, 1991b; Bloomfield 1996; Dickhaut et al. 2003) , but have abstracted away from the information processing effects of the concreteness principle that motivate the first set of studies.
We attempt to meld these different perspectives in the current study, reporting laboratory market evidence that both the cognitive and strategic perspectives of accounting disclosure can coexist, with neither perspective negating the other. Consistent with the cognitive perspective, we find that buyers bid more for risky prospects when a seller discloses the prospect's maximum possible outcome than when the seller discloses the minimum possible outcome. Consistent with the strategic perspective, we also find that buyers systematically discount bids to a strategic seller who chooses the disclosure, relative to the bids observed in a control condition in which a nonstrategic seller is constrained to determine disclosures randomly. Most importantly, we find that these two phenomena do not interact, meaning that the cognitive tendency for buyers to pay more for a maximum-value disclosure than for a minimum-value disclosure continues to apply whether the disclosing seller is strategic or nonstrategic.
For academic research, this finding is important because it begins to address qualifications in the literature that reactions to exogenously manipulated disclosures might not generalize to environments with endogenous disclosures. This is noteworthy because exogenous manipulation under ceteris paribus conditions is a primary tool in the experimentalist's arsenal.
We find that strategic, endogenous disclosures can systematically shift users' reactions in a manner consistent with the tenets of information economics, but without necessarily negating the relative differences in information processing that arise from psychology's "concreteness principle" in settings with exogenous disclosures.
For practice, our results underscore that both cognitive information processing effects and strategic inferences can impact users' reactions to accounting disclosures (Kachelmeier and King 2002) . This is important because if cognitive effects generalize to a strategic environment, then accounting policies with multiple options can present managers with opportunities to favor disclosures that exploit cognitive phenomena. Consistent with economic reasoning, we find that sellers usually choose between an upside or downside risk disclosure based on whichever value results in a higher implied expected value of the risky prospect, and buyers anticipate this strategy. But we also find several cases in which sellers disclose the upside potential of the risky prospect, even though the downside value would suggest a higher overall expected value. This seemingly irrational behavior makes sense if we also take the cognitive perspective into account.
In Section II, we motivate the theoretical arguments underlying both the cognitive and strategic considerations of interest. We then describe our experimental design in Section III and present results in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II. Theory and Hypotheses

One-Sided Disclosures of Risk
Risk conveys uncertainty: an outcome can be better or worse than expected. Disclosures can divulge both sides of this uncertainty, but it is common in practice to observe partial, one-sided disclosures of risk. For example, Kennedy et al. (1998) conduct an individualjudgment experiment patterned after the varying ways in which firms disclose conditional environmental liabilities. Participants in their study estimate lower liabilities when a minimum liability amount is disclosed than when a maximum is disclosed. The authors interpret this finding as a form of anchoring on an explicit disclosure reference, with insufficient adjustments for the other side of the distribution. In a different context patterned after disclosures in the extractive industries, Dietrich et al. (2001) conduct a laboratory market experiment that demonstrates a similar phenomenon. They find that participants trade at systematically higher prices when financial statements disclose the upside potential of a valuable asset than when statements disclose the downside risk. This effect occurs even though participants know they are dealing with symmetric distributions, which in theory should enable the accurate inference of downside risk from the disclosure of upside potential and vice versa. Both studies are consistent with the cognitive "concreteness principle" that decision makers emphasize explicit information over that which must be inferred (Slovic 1972; Payne et al. 1993; Mellers et al. 1998 ).
The fact that this cognitive effect was observed in both an individual-judgment study with contextually rich materials and loss prospects (Kennedy et al. 1998) and in an interactive, cash-compensated laboratory market study with relatively abstract materials and gain prospects (Dietrich et al. 2001) suggests that it is a robust phenomenon that is an ideal candidate for our extension shortly to a strategic disclosure environment. We begin by hypothesizing a main effect of one-sided risk disclosures similar to that observed in these two other studies:
H1: Relative to expected value, buyers' bids for a risky prospect will be greater when the seller discloses the highest possible outcome than when the seller discloses the lowest possible outcome. Dye (2001, 184) describes the central premise of disclosure as the prediction that "any entity contemplating making a disclosure will disclose information that is favorable to the entity, and will not disclose information unfavorable to the entity." Accordingly, economic logic dictates that recipients will discount any disclosure that reflects an opportunistic choice based on the seller's private information. For one-sided disclosures of risky prospects, this prediction holds irrespective of whether the seller discloses the highest or the lowest possible outcome.
Strategic Discounting
To illustrate with the parameters used in our experiment, suppose a seller offers potential buyers a risky prospect that has two possible outcomes: a low outcome known to be distributed uniformly between $0 and $5.00, or a high outcome distributed uniformly between $5.00 and $10.00. Suppose that the seller knows the ex ante realizations of both the low and high possible outcomes, but not the ex post realization of which of these two possibilities actually obtains. To 1 One might question the constraint that sellers cannot disclose both values, as the familiar "unraveling" logic predicts full disclosure of all but the lowest possible values (e.g., see King and Wallin 1991a; Dickhaut et al. 2003) . Aside from the practical importance of one-sided disclosures of risky prospects (Kennedy et al. 1998; Dietrich et al. 2001; Hodder et al. 2001) , we justify the restriction to partial disclosure in this study on two grounds. First, one can conceive of the disclosure choice in this study as a metaphor for the frequent cases in which accounting regulators allow one of two or more alternatives, but not all alternatives simultaneously. Second, as an empirical matter, evidence indicates that partial disclosures persist even when the "unraveling" prediction of full disclosure applies (e.g., the fully informed seller condition in King and Wallin 1991a). focus on the biasing effects of one-sided disclosures, we consider the case in which the seller can disclose the exact amount of one of the two possible outcomes, but not both.
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For example, suppose the seller observes that the low possible outcome is $3.00 (50 cents above the low distribution's midpoint) and the high possible outcome is $7.50 (at the midpoint of the high distribution). The seller discloses that the low value is $3.00. Considering first the benchmark case in which a nonstrategic seller's disclosure is known to be beyond the seller's discretion, potential buyers would infer an expected value for the risky prospect equal to the average of the disclosed value and the midpoint of the distribution that is not disclosed:
.5($3.00) + .5($5.00 + $10.00)/2 = $5.25 (slightly good news). Now consider the case in which the seller chooses which value to disclose. In the above example, the seller desiring to maximize the implied expected value would rather disclose a low possible outcome of $3.00 than a high possible outcome of $7.50. The low value implies a higher expected value for the prospect because it is higher relative to its individual distribution.
However, rational buyers would be aware of the seller's information advantage. Their best response would be to infer that the value not disclosed by the seller could not possibly be more favorable (from the seller's perspective) than the value disclosed. This reasoning results in a truncated distribution for the nondisclosed value, bounded at a point equally extreme to that of the disclosed value. In a strategic environment, if the seller discloses that the low potential outcome is $3.00, the revised expected value estimate taking the seller's information advantage into account is .5($3.00) + .5($5.00 + $8.00)/2 = $4.75 (slightly bad news). The intuition is that if the seller is allowed to choose, the distribution of disclosed values shifts upwards by an amount that is offset by buyers' anticipation of this shift. In this example, the 50-cent difference between the inferred expected values in the nonstrategic and strategic disclosure environments is the predicted amount of strategic discounting. In general, the amount of predicted strategic discounting increases as the seller's disclosed value decreases (relative to its ex ante distribution), because as the seller's disclosure becomes less favorable, the news not disclosed must become even worse (i.e., truncating more of the nondisclosed distribution).
Note that the observations from this example would be identical if it were reversed to assume a low possible outcome of $2.50 (midpoint of the low distribution) and a high possible outcome of $8.00 (50 cents above the midpoint of the high distribution). In this case, a strategic seller would disclose the high possibility, because it is higher relative to its individual ex ante uniform distribution than the low possibility. The "naive" (nondiscounted) expected value under nonstrategic disclosure would again be $5.25 (= .5($0 + $5.00)/2 + .5($8.00)), and the strategically discounted expected value assuming opportunistic disclosure would again be $4.75 (= .5($0 + $3.00)/2 + .5($8.00)). Put differently, the "anchoring" effect of higher bids for high-outcome disclosures as predicted in H1 is separate from the strategic discounting effect illustrated here for both low and high-outcome disclosures. The former is a cognitive phenomenon, whereas strategic discounting derives from economic reasoning. If the high and low disclosures are equally extreme relative to their ex ante distributions in this setting, economic reasoning would predict the same degree of strategic discounting.
Consistent with prior studies of strategic discounting from discretionary disclosures in other contexts (e.g., King and Wallin 1991a, 1991b; Bloomfield 1996; Dickhaut et al. 2003) , our second hypothesis predicts that conditional on the disclosed value, bids will be lower under strategic disclosure than in a nonstrategic control condition with random disclosure.
H2: For any given disclosed value, buyers will discount their bids in the strategic disclosure condition relative to the amounts bid in the nonstrategic disclosure condition.
Possible Interaction Between One-Sided Disclosures of Risk and Strategic Discounting
The accounting literature investigating user reactions to disclosures has generally tested either a cognitive premise motivated from the concreteness principle or a strategic premise motivated from information economics, but not both. The incremental contribution of this study is that we incorporate within the same experimental design both a cognitive information processing bias (anchoring on one-sided risk disclosures) and strategic discounting of opportunistic disclosures. Are these phenomena truly independent, or would different cognitive information processing effects occur if users knew that disclosures were chosen strategically?
The literature certainly seems skeptical of this possibility. Several studies with manipulated (i.e., exogenous) disclosures acknowledge limited ability to generalize to a more strategic setting with endogenous disclosures (e.g., Bloomfield and Libby 1996; Hopkins 1996; Kennedy et al. 1998; Bloomfield and Wilks 2000; Hopkins et al. 2000; Dietrich et al. 2001) . For one-sided risk disclosures in particular, Kennedy et al. (1998) acknowledge that references to "management" in their experimental case materials could have confounded the anchoring effect motivating their study with strategic considerations. Similar issues characterize Dietrich et al.'s (2001) laboratory market study of experimenter-manipulated risk disclosures, leading the authors to qualify their study's applicability to more realistic environments in which "investors make strategic inferences about management's disclosure choices" (2001, 266) .
2 In Kennedy et al. (1998) , management would presumably prefer users to infer a low estimate of the firm's contingent environmental liability. Thus, the direction of preference is opposite that of the current study.
It is plausible that knowledge of management's information advantage could sensitize users to any cognitive tendency to anchor on the side of a risky distribution that is disclosed explicitly. That is, if management discloses the upside potential of a gain prospect, users' knowledge that this disclosure is what management prefers to disclose could trigger a more skeptical response that offsets the tendency to overweight the upside of the distribution.
However, a supplemental experiment conducted by Kennedy et al. (1998, §5.3) does not support such a conjecture. They observed the same anchoring effect whether the case materials referred to the disclosing agent as an independent engineering firm or as the company's management (although users judged the independent engineering firm to be more credible).
manipulate the literal ability of human participants to choose disclosures, offering risky prospects to real buyers in a market setting with meaningful cash consequences. If we support Kennedy et al.'s (1998) conclusion even with this more literal operationalization of strategic disclosure, we gain more confidence regarding the robustness of cognitive information processing phenomena to a strategic environment. Because the issue remains largely an empirical question with skepticism and tenable arguments on both sides, we express the corresponding hypothesis in the null form:
H3: The tendency for buyers to bid more for a risky prospect when the seller discloses the highest possible outcome than when the seller discloses the lowest possible outcome (relative to expected value) will not interact with the manipulation of strategic disclosure, such that a significant cognitive anchoring effect will be manifest under both nonstrategic and strategic disclosure.
Implications for Strategic Sellers
Suppose that we do not reject the null for H3, indicating that buyers anchor on one-sided disclosures of risk in both nonstrategic and strategic disclosure environments. A provocative implication is that strategic sellers (or managers, in general) could exploit such a bias, preferring in certain cases not to disclose the potential outcome that maximizes the implied expected value of the risky prospect, but rather to disclose the high value (presuming that the seller prefers higher bids). Returning to an earlier example, if the anchoring effect in H1 holds even in a strategic environment, it is not necessarily clear that a strategic seller would prefer to disclose a low possible outcome of $3.00 (from an ex ante distribution between $0 and $5.00) in lieu of disclosing a high possible outcome of $7.50 (from an ex ante distribution between $5.00 and $10.00). From an economic perspective, disclosing the low possibility maximizes the prospect's implied expected value. However, disclosing the high possibility could exploit the anchoring effect for one-sided disclosures of risk. We test this reasoning in our fourth and final hypothesis:
H4: To the extent that sellers do not disclose the possible outcome that maximizes the implied expected value of a risky prospect in the strategic disclosure condition, they will tend to favor disclosing the high possible outcome.
Other Considerations
As supplemental evidence, we investigate the robustness of our findings to two additional factors. First, we investigate whether the risky prospect under consideration is a gain or loss prospect. In our setting, sellers present gain prospects as an opportunity for buyers to obtain an uncertain gain. For loss prospects, sellers present buyers with an opportunity to avoid an uncertain loss that the buyer would otherwise incur. Given this structure, sellers prefer higher estimates of the risky prospect (and hence higher bids) in both the gain and loss conditions. If buyers are risk averse, they would subtract a risk discount for gain prospects and add a risk premium to avoid loss prospects. Thus, we would expect higher bids in the loss setting than in the gain setting. Prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) suggests that buyers might not be as risk averse (or could even be risk seeking) for losses relative to gains, but the more important question for our research objective is whether the findings for one-sided disclosures and strategic disclosures generalize to both gain and loss settings.
As explained in the next section, we also examine the robustness of our results to an environment with maximum opportunities for learning and feedback. Under a first-price auction mechanism, feedback on other buyers' bids is likely to lower bids overall, because buyers would be better able to estimate minimum winning bids. Feedback could also sensitize users to strategic opportunism.
III. Experimental Task and Design
Overview
Graduate students were recruited from master's-level accounting classes at a large university for a compensated market experiment. Each of 12 two-hour experimental sessions involved one seller and three buyers (assigned randomly), for a total of 48 participants. The instructions indicated that the experiment would consist of four rounds of ten trials each. Before each of these 40 trials, the seller drew a card from a customized deck of low values, ranging from $0 to $5.00 in 10 cent increments, and also drew a card from a deck of high values, ranging from $5.00 to $10.00. The experimenter shuffled both decks with replacement before each trial.
Six of the twelve sessions involved strategic disclosure, meaning that the seller could observe both cards and choose whether to disclose the high value or the low value. 3 While sellers could choose which card to disclose, the disclosure had to be truthful. 4 In the six other sessions, the seller was bound by a random determination (the draw of a chip) of which value to disclose. In these nonstrategic disclosure sessions, the seller did not make any decisions, and buyers knew this, but we used a human seller anyway to hold constant any other considerations involving buyer-seller interaction, such as concerns for fairness (Luft 1997) .
Gain and Loss Prospects
The four rounds of each session (ten trials each) alternated between an uncertain gain condition and an uncertain loss condition, with the order counterbalanced across sessions. For uncertain gains, buyers began each trial with an endowment of $10.00, from which they could 5 By adding the ex ante expected value of the prospect to the endowment in the uncertain loss condition, we create economically equivalent prospects for a risk-neutral bidder in a manner similar to Luft's (1994) construction of economically equivalent bonus vs. penalty schemes. To see this, note that a risk-neutral bidder in the gain condition would be indifferent to fixed wealth of $10.00 (the endowment) or fixed wealth of $5.00 (= $10.00 -risk-neutral bid of $5.00) and a lottery with a 50 percent probability of an expected return of $2.50 or an expected return of $7.50, leaving expected final wealth states of $7.50 or $12.50, with equal probability. In the loss condition, a risk-neutral bidder would be willing to forfeit the expected value of $5.00 to avoid the loss prospect, again leaving indifference between fixed wealth of $10.00 (= $15.00 endowment less the $5.00 bid) or a lottery with expected final wealth states of $7.50 (= $15.00 -$7.50) or $12.50 (= $15.00 -$2.50), with equal probability. For risk-averse or risk-seeking bidders, there is some potential for wealth effects, but Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) show that wealth effects in experiments of this type are likely to be negligible even for much larger sums.
bid on a gain prospect that would yield either the high or low card value drawn by the seller, with equal probability. Before disclosure, the expected value of the prospect was $5.00 (i.e., .5($0 + $5.00)/2 + .5($5.00 + $10.00)/2). For uncertain losses, buyers began each trial with a larger endowment of $15.00, but had to subtract the outcome of a similarly structured loss prospect unless they successfully bid to pay the winning bid in lieu of bearing the loss prospect.
5
For both gain and loss prospects, the seller determined randomly or by preference (depending on the condition) which of the two possible outcomes would be disclosed (low or high), after which the experimenter announced the disclosed card. At this point, the three buyers entered bids on private bid sheets that were observed by the experimenter. Post disclosure, bids would of course be expected to reflect the information content of the disclosed card. Accordingly, we control for the expected value implied by the disclosed card in our analyses.
Compensation
Buyers tallied their bids for each trial, with knowledge that if the trial were selected for compensation, the high bidder would pay the amount of his/her bid to obtain the gain prospect or avoid the loss prospect, as applicable. Bids under a first-price auction of this nature do not necessarily elicit the bidder's reservation price, because the high bidder wishes only to exceed the next highest bid (Kagel 1995) . We use this mechanism anyway in view of its simplicity and popularity in prior strategic bidding experiments (e.g., King 1996; Dickhaut et al. 2003) . Any incentive compatibility limitation of a first-price auction would be unlikely to interact with our primary interest in the influence of strategic disclosures. As explained shortly, we also vary the provision of feedback to gauge buyers' sensitivity to the knowledge of others' bids.
All participants knew that for each trial selected for compensation, the seller would receive a $5.00 fixed stipend plus the amount of the high bid. This structure created an incentive for the seller to prefer high bids in both the gain and loss conditions. In the strategic disclosure condition, sellers could attempt to influence bids by choosing to reveal the high or the low card after privately observing both values. Sellers had no such discretion in the nonstrategic disclosure condition, but were compensated the same way in order to maintain a ceteris paribus structure.
The instructions informed all participants that at the end of the experiment, four trials, one from each round of ten, would be selected randomly for cash compensation. At the end of the session, a volunteer participant drew numbered chips to determine the four payment trials.
Only at that point were the actual outcomes of those four trials determined (i.e., a 50 percent chance of either the high card or the low card drawn for that trial). Paying only a random subset of the trials could discourage certain complex multiperiod disclosure strategies, such as the "pool shark" disclosure behavior observed by Dickhaut et al. (2003) , in which sellers intentionally chose suboptimal disclosures in early rounds (generating early losses) in order to lull buyers into a false sense of trust that could be exploited later on. However, complex strategies such as this are not germane to our research objective. By giving the single-period strategic prediction of H2 its best shot, we enable a more forceful test of the potential interaction between the strategic and cognitive effects of disclosure. In other words, any behavioral effect of our incentive structure is consistent with the intent of H2, though as a practical matter, evidence from Starmer and Sugden 6 In numbers, the naive expected value is .5L + .5($5.00 + $10.00)/2 = .5L + $3.75, where L is a disclosed low possible outcome, or .5($0 + $5.00)/2 + .5H = $1.25 + .5H, where H is a disclosed high possible outcome.
(1991) suggests that randomly paying a subset of the trials at a higher payoff rate (as opposed to paying all trials at a lower rate) is unlikely to materially affect decisions.
At the end of the session, payoff trials were conducted and payments were disbursed as promised, with no deception of any form. Participants' compensation ranged from $34.50 to $49.50, with an average of $40.49.
Feedback
After an uncertain gain round of ten trials and an uncertain loss round of ten trials (order counterbalanced across sessions), we conducted two additional rounds to complete each session.
The final two rounds were conducted in a manner identical to the first two, with the exception that in the final two rounds, we provided feedback at the end of each trial consisting of both card values drawn by the seller (i.e., both potential outcomes) and the bids of each of the three buyers. We did this to gauge the robustness of our primary hypotheses to an environment with maximum opportunities for learning and feedback. However, even in the rounds with feedback, we did not determine the actual outcomes of the compensated trials until the end of the session.
IV. Results
Dependent Variable
We standardize the winning (i.e., highest) bid for each trial by subtracting the naive expected value implied by the disclosed card for that trial. The "naive" qualifier refers to the expected value before strategic discounting, or simply the average of the disclosed value (which is either the low or the high possible outcome) and the midpoint of the ex ante distribution for the value not disclosed. 6 An alternative would be to subtract adjusted expected values that reflect the predicted amount of strategic discounting in the strategic disclosure condition by truncating the distribution of the value not disclosed at an amount equally extreme to the disclosed value. We favor using the naive expected value so that we have comparable metrics in both the random and strategic disclosure conditions, thereby allowing us to test statistically for the difference between disclosure conditions that H2 predicts will result from strategic discounting. Thus, the reader should keep in mind that differences from naive expected values in the strategic disclosure condition reflect not only risk preferences, but also reflect strategic discounting. We replicated all tests standardizing by adjusted expected values in the strategic disclosure condition, finding similar results for the effects of one-sided risk disclosures but no significant differences between the strategic and nonstrategic disclosure conditions, as one would expect by construction if buyers discount strategic disclosures by the amounts of the adjustment.
To construct statistically independent observations, we average the standardized winning bids across all trials in each round within each session, with separate averages for the trials with a disclosed high card and a disclosed low card. This procedure results in eight repeatedmeasures observations per session (two possible disclosures × two gain/loss conditions × two feedback conditions). Although the winning bid has a natural interpretation as the bid that "counts," we repeated this process for standardized median bids in lieu of winning bids, reaching the same conclusions for the four hypotheses set forth in Section II. Table 1 reports means by treatment condition for the dependent variable described above. Table 2 reports a repeated-measures ANOVA analysis of this data, with one between-sessions factor (strategic vs. random disclosure condition) and three within-sessions factors (high/low disclosure, gain/loss prospects, and feedback).
[
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE]
H1: Anchoring on One-Sided Disclosures of Risk
Controlling for the expected value implied by the disclosed card, winning bidders paid $0.61 more, on average, when the seller disclosed the high possible outcome than when the seller disclosed the low possible outcome. Table 2 shows that this anchoring effect is statistically significant (F = 8.80; p < .01), in the direction predicted by H1. Overall, our study corroborates the conclusions reported in different settings by Kennedy et al. (1998) and Dietrich et al. (2001) :
users weight the side of a risky distribution that is disclosed over the side they must infer.
Notwithstanding the significant main effect for the disclosure of high vs. low possible outcomes, Table 2 However, the three-way interaction between feedback, high vs. low disclosure, and strategic vs.
nonstrategic disclosure is negligible (F = 0.01; p > .50), indicating that any mitigating influence of feedback applies whether or not sellers disclosed potential outcomes strategically. Thus, while interesting in its own right, the significant high/low × feedback interaction does not appear to bear upon our primary interest in strategic disclosure. We discuss feedback in more detail later, including an attempt to differentiate feedback from learning over time.
H2: Strategic Disclosure and Discounting
Before we test for strategic discounting, we conduct two preliminary tests. First, as a manipulation check, we asked buyers in a post-experimental questionnaire if sellers' disclosures were chosen by the seller or were beyond the seller's control. All buyers answered this question correctly for their respective disclosure conditions. Second, the prediction of strategic discounting in H2 is predicated on the assumption that sellers in the strategic disclosure condition will disclose in a manner consistent with their preferences for higher bids. Accordingly, for each trial, we determined the optimal disclosure under the decision rule of disclosing the card value that implies the higher expected value of the risky prospect. Across all trials in the strategic disclosure condition, sellers disclosed the predicted card 69 percent of the time, which exceeds chance (50 percent) at a statistically significant level (p < .01). Thus, sellers generally behaved as economic reasoning would dictate, but not always. As reported later in our test of H4, the 31 percent incidence of disclosure "errors" reflects a systematic tendency to favor disclosing the high card.
Given a successful manipulation and a propensity for sellers to disclose in an opportunistic manner in the strategic disclosure condition, we test whether buyers anticipated the information advantage of sellers and discounted their bids accordingly. Relative to naive expected value, winning bids were $0.50 lower, on average, in the strategic disclosure condition than in the random disclosure condition. Supporting H2, Table 2 shows that this difference is statistically significant (F = 2.75; p = .06), albeit slightly above the conventional .05 significance level. To corroborate this finding, an advantage of an experimental economics approach is that we can compute the expected amount of strategic discounting and compare this to our observed difference. On average, we expect sellers in the strategic disclosure condition to disclose values that are two-thirds above the low bound (and one-third below the high bound) of the respective 7 To compute the two-thirds value, consider two independent draws from uniform distributions bounded between 0 and 1. The central tendency of the average of these two draws is of course 1/2. To compute the central tendency of the maximum of the two draws, note that if the maximum value is X, the average value is .5X + .5(X/2), where the second term truncates the distribution of the other value at X. Setting .5X + .5(X/2) = 1/2 yields X = 2/3. 8 If a strategic seller discloses a low possible outcome of $3.33 (two-thirds between the boundaries of $0 and $5.00), the naive expected value before strategic discounting is .5($3.33) + .5($5.00 + $10.00)/2 = $5.42, but the true expected value is .5($3.33) + .5($5.00 + $8.33)/2 = $5.00. The difference is $0.42, the predicted amount of strategic discounting. Identical estimates would apply if the seller discloses a high possible outcome of $8.33 (two-thirds between the boundaries of $5.00 and $10.00). distribution ranges.
7 Intuitively, the seller's information advantage allows the seller to communicate a value higher than the midpoint, on average. Using this reasoning as a benchmark, we expect the average strategic discount to be $0.42. 8 Our observed average strategic discount of $0.50 is reasonably close to this estimate. We conclude that the strategic discounting observed in different settings by King and Wallin (1991a , 1991b ), Bloomfield (1996 , and Dickhaut et al. (2003) also applies here. Buyers discount their bids to offset the information advantage reflected in sellers' strategic disclosures.
H3: Interaction Between One-Sided Disclosure of Risk and Strategic Discounting
In contrast to the significant main effects for anchoring on one-sided risk disclosures (H1) and strategic discounting (H2), Table 2 reports a negligible interaction between these two effects (F = 0.02; p > .50). We do not reject the null for H3. It appears that the effects of anchoring and strategic discounting are independent and additive, with neither effect negating the other. Figure 1 illustrates this core result. Although winning bids relative to naive expected values are systematically lower under strategic disclosure than under nonstrategic disclosure (as H2 predicts), the H1 anchoring effect is nearly identical in the two disclosure conditions. Specifically, the average excess of winning bids for high over low disclosed possible outcomes is $0.58 in the random disclosure condition and $0.64 in the strategic disclosure condition.
Supplemental simple-effect tests (not tabulated) confirm that the high-low differences are statistically significant at the .05 level in both disclosure conditions, as is the overall effect noted earlier in support of H1. In sum, we find that an anchoring effect similar to that documented by Kennedy et al. (1998) and Dietrich et al. (2001) continues to apply whether or not disclosures are subject to known opportunistic preferences. At least for this particular cognitive phenomenon, our results therefore suggest that we can "remove the asterisk" of qualifications about the generalizability of findings to settings with endogenous disclosures chosen by strategic agents.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
H4: Implications for Sellers
If bidders overweight one-sided disclosures of risk in both nonstrategic and strategic disclosure environments, a provocative implication is that strategic sellers (or managers, in general) have an opportunity to exploit this cognitive phenomenon. That is, rather than just disclose the potential outcome that maximizes the implied expected value of the prospect, as our earlier economic reasoning suggested, the results from H3 imply that sellers could also profit by disclosing the high potential outcome.
To test this implication, we examine seller disclosure behavior in more detail. As reported earlier, sellers in the strategic disclosure condition chose to reveal the predicted card 69 percent of the time. However, the remaining 31 percent of the disclosures were not random errors. Rather, 66 percent of the "error" disclosures were high-card disclosures, supporting H4 (p < .01). Put differently, 89 percent of the strategic disclosures were either the high card or the card that maximized the implied expected value (or both if the card that maximized expected value was also the high card). The fact that buyers bid more for high-card disclosures suggests that at least some seller disclosure "errors" may have been intentional and profitable. An 9 If we use median bids as the basis for the dependent variable instead of winning bids, there is a marginally significant interaction between gain vs. loss prospects and strategic disclosure (F = 4.21; p = .07), indicating that the degree of buyers' strategic discounting was greater for loss prospects than for gain prospects. We hesitate to interpret this finding, given that we did not predict it ex ante and that it disappears for winning bids.
alternative interpretation is that sellers fell prey to the same cognitive anchoring effect that influenced buyers. Either way, the data suggest that sellers capitalized on the tendency among buyers to pay more when the high possible outcome was disclosed.
Other Findings
Beyond the effects of anchoring on one-sided risk disclosures (H1) and strategic discounting (H2), the ANOVA in Table 2 also shows significant main effects for gain vs. loss prospects (F = 7.86; p < .01) and feedback (F = 14.50; p < .01). For gains vs. losses, winning bidders paid an excess of $0.79 to avoid a loss prospect over the amount bid to obtain a gain prospect, controlling for expected value. This excess is nearly identical in the nonstrategic disclosure condition ($0.78) and in the strategic disclosure condition ($0.79).
9 Within the nonstrategic condition, in which the "naive" (nondiscounted) expected value is also the true expected value, winning bidders paid an implied risk premium of $0.75 over expected value to avoid loss prospects and paid $0.03 less than expected value to obtain gain prospects. This finding is consistent with a general propensity towards risk aversion among winning bidders.
In addition, winning bids were $0.74 lower, on average, for the rounds in which participants received feedback after each trial on other buyers' bids and on both possible outcomes of the risky prospects. Under a first-price auction mechanism, we would expect bid feedback to lower bids if it provides buyers with a more accurate basis for estimating the minimum winning bid. A problem with this interpretation is that the feedback rounds came after the nonfeedback rounds, such that our manipulation of feedback is confounded with simple 10 The usual control for this problem is to counterbalance the order of repeated-measures factors across sessions. However, we could not counterbalance the order of providing feedback, because if feedback were available initially, it would undoubtedly exert some carryover influence if feedback were later withheld.
11 F-statistics are below 1.00 for all interactions involving high vs. low disclosure and strategic vs. nonstrategic disclosure. The lowest p-value is a clearly insignificant p = .42 for the four-way interaction among all four experimental factors. with an incremental drop of $0.26 attributable to the introduction of feedback (one-tailed p = .07, conditional on the expectation of lower bids after feedback). The significant overall effect of the categorical "feedback" factor in the Table 2 ANOVA therefore likely reflects both trend (i.e., learning) and perhaps some incremental effect of the feedback information.
Notwithstanding that the final two rounds our experiment likely reflect the influence of both learning and feedback, our more central interest is whether an environment with maximum opportunities for learning and feedback modifies our conclusions regarding cognitive and strategic disclosure effects. As previously noted, the effect of high vs. low disclosure (H1) does interact with feedback/learning, indicating that over time (and with feedback), buyers were less inclined to overweight the disclosed side of the distribution. However, the three-way interaction among feedback/learning, high vs. low disclosure, and strategic vs. nonstrategic disclosure is negligible (F = 0.01; p > .50). 11 Put differently, the lines depicted in Figure 1 remain nearly parallel across all rounds of the experiment, meaning that any mitigating influence of learning and/or feedback on the propensity for buyers to pay more for high-outcome disclosures is just as 12 Also see Libby et al. (2002) for a more detailed review of experimental research in financial accounting.
pronounced when disclosures are nonstrategic as when they are chosen by a strategic seller.
Thus, whether the last two rounds reflect some influence of feedback, a more general influence of learning, or both, any such influence does not appear to qualify our primary conclusion in H3 about the robustness of cognitive disclosure phenomena to a strategic environment.
V. Conclusions
Kachelmeier and King (2002) The fact that these two literatures have proceeded along largely separate paths is not necessarily a problem if they investigate separate phenomena. However, this separation has not prevented skepticism, as is evidenced by the many studies with experimenter-manipulated disclosure alternatives that acknowledge questionable generalizability to a more strategic environment with endogenous disclosures. For accounting disclosures, it would seem that exogenous manipulation is both a powerful tool and a troublesome limitation. In the end, however, this limitation reduces to an empirical question. Our primary goal in the current study is to begin building a bridge between the cognitive and strategic disclosure literatures, using the effect of anchoring on one-sided disclosures of risk as a vehicle for investigating the robustness of a cognitive disclosure bias to strategic inferences.
Consistent with prior studies of strategic discounting (e.g., King and Wallin 1991a, 1991b; Bloomfield 1996; Dickhaut et al. 2003) , we find that buyers in our experiment (the analog to investors) anticipate the information advantage reflected in disclosures by strategic sellers (the analog to managers), and discount their bids accordingly. A control condition with nonstrategic, random disclosure helps us to reinforce this finding. Consistent with prior studies of one-sided disclosures of risk (e.g., Kennedy et al. 1998; Dietrich et al. 2001) , we also find that buyers' bids reflect anchoring on the side of a risky distribution that is disclosed explicitly.
More importantly, this anchoring phenomenon remains significant and is nearly identical in magnitude whether disclosures are nonstrategic (i.e., exogenous) or strategic (i.e., endogenous).
Strategic sellers in our study exploit this bias by considering not only the implied expected value of the risky prospect, but also favoring to disclose the maximum rather than the minimum possible outcome. Dietrich et al. (2001) offer a similar implication regarding the tendency of firms in the oil and gas industry to volunteer the upside potential of reserves, but not the downside risk.
An implication of these results for policymakers considering new disclosures (e.g., AICPA 1994) is that both cognitive and strategic considerations can coexist, exerting separate and additive influences on users. Moreover, to the extent that cognitive information processing effects are robust to a strategic environment, managers can find themselves with an 13 For an example not involving disclosures of risk per se, if reporting comprehensive income in a separate performance statement helps users to uncover earnings management (Hirst and Hopkins 1998) and assess earnings volatility (Maines and McDaniel 2000) , one should not be surprised that the substantial majority of managers favor the less user-friendly option of reporting comprehensive income as a reconciling item in the Statement of Stockholders' Equity. expanded set of strategic opportunities that extend those typically considered in economic models of disclosure (Dye 2001; Verrecchia 2001). 13 Our study is limited to one-sided disclosure of risky prospects, which is only one of the many cognitive disclosure issues examined to date (Libby et al. 2002) . These results do not necessarily imply that other cognitive biases involving accounting disclosures are robust to strategic considerations. Borrowing from a classification scheme set forth by Arkes (1991) , association-based errors and psychophysical cognitive errors like anchoring are likely to be robust. Conversely, Arkes (1991) also identifies several strategy-based cognitive errors that are more sensitive to incentives in the strategic environment, similar to the demonstrations by Kennedy (1993 Kennedy ( , 1995 that accountability can mitigate recency and hindsight bias in auditing.
We encourage future researchers to continue progress on the bridge between the cognitive and strategic features of disclosure (Kachelmeier and King 2002) . At the same time, we also see a role for studies that take advantage of the ability of an experiment to vary one feature at a time, building theory in increments. Studies with exogenous manipulation of disclosures such as Kennedy et al. (1998) and Dietrich et al. (2001) are limited, but that limitation is more an empirical question than a weakness. It is reasonable to begin the exploration of an interesting disclosure phenomenon by observing its influence as an experimenter-manipulated treatment factor under ceteris paribus conditions, either in a contextually rich individual-judgment setting (e.g., Kennedy et al. 1998) or in an interactive, market setting (e.g., Dietrich et al. 2001) . To the extent that other studies such as ours can then generalize the robustness of these cognitive phenomena to richer, more strategic environments with endogenous disclosures, we gain more from the progression of the literature as a whole than from any one study considered in isolation. Note: The "standardized winning bid" is the average difference between the winning (i.e., highest) bids across all trials in each round within each session and the corresponding naive expected values of the risky prospects for those trials. In turn, the "naive expected value" is the average of the disclosed card value and the midpoint of the ex ante distribution for the nondisclosed card (i.e., not adjusted for the predicted discount to reflect the seller's information advantage in the strategic disclosure condition). Notes: a Dependent variable = standardized winning bid, the average difference between the winning bids across all trials in each round for each session and the naive (i.e., unadjusted for strategic discounting) expected values of the risky prospects (see Table 1 ). b The p-values for main effects are one-tailed, conditional on the predicted directions. For interactions, p-values are two-tailed. c DISCLOSURE CONDITION = binary factor to differentiate the manipulation of strategic vs. random disclosure. d HIGH/LOW = binary factor to differentiate trials in which the seller disclosed the high potential outcome vs. the low potential outcome. e GAIN/LOSS = binary factor to differentiate trials involving gain vs. loss prospects. f FEEDBACK = binary factor to differentiate trials before and after providing feedback after each trial on buyers' bids and the card values drawn by the seller. g Three-and four-way interactions are suppressed to minimize clutter, as none are significant at conventional levels (lowest p = .20 for HIGH/LOW × GAIN/LOSS × FEEDBACK).
Figure 1
High -Low Anchoring Effect in Both Disclosure Conditions Note: The "standardized winning bid" is the average difference between the winning bids across all trials in each round for each session and the naive (i.e., unadjusted for strategic discounting) expected values of the risky prospects (see Table 1 ).
